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1. Introduction 
This paper takes a constitutional economics outlook at science as a social process, as 
“a process in which conflicts about truth are resolved” (Buchanan 2001c: 154).
1 The 
adopted perspective is ‘economic’ in the sense that the agents in the science-arena, as 
in all other social arenas, are assumed to act on their self-interest, and it is 
‘constitutional’ in the sense that its focus is on the ways in which the ‘rules of the 
game’ affect the ways in which the social process of science operates. 
 With  its  constitutional outlook this paper takes its departure from the more 
broadly defined economics of science, a growing body of literature that is related to, 
and did in part evolve from, the traditional field of economic methodology (Wible 
1998; Hands 2001: 353ff.; Mirowski 2004). A major contribution of the economics of 
science literature is to have narrowed the divide between, on the one side, a 
methodology or philosophy of science that inquires into the standards that define 
science as a truth-seeking enterprise and, on the other side, an empirical-sociological 
outlook at science that emphasizes the private ambitions that actually motivate the 
players in the science arena, and the social influences to which they are subject, 
ambitions and influences that may well corrupt their scientific objectivity. 
  My particular interest here will be in the use that is often made of the science-
as-market analogy in support of the argument that, just as it helps in markets to align 
self-interest and the common good, the ‘invisible hand’ of competition can be trusted 
to do its beneficial work in science as well. In focusing on the role that constitutional 
constraints play in conditioning the workings of the ‘invisible hand’ in science, just as 
they do in markets, the present paper aims at further clarifying the relation between 
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1 The concern here is only with empirical science for which the way the world is does “meaningfully 
constrain what is believed to be” (Leonard 2002: 160). Accordingly, the notion of “truth” is meant to 
imply that the participants “in the process acknowledge the existence of a reality that is itself 
independent of any belief about it” (Buchanan 2001c: 154). methodological rules and a social process that works with self-interested and 
potentially biased individual agents. A central argument will be that, in the case of 
science just as in the case of markets, the question of how science and markets work 
as social processes under de facto given conditions, including the prevailing 
institutional-constitutional  conditions, must be distinguished from the question of 
what kind of institutional-constitutional conditions would be required in order for 
science and markets to serve their desired social function. In terms of this distinction, 
descriptive accounts of the social process of science focus on the first question, while 
methodological arguments on the norms of scientific inquiry are concerned with the 
second. In a sense similar to Adam Smith’s notion of political economy as “the 
science of a legislator” (Smith 1981: 486), methodology, so interpreted, can be said to 
be concerned with identifying the kinds of constitutional constraints, i.e. the kind of 
rules or ‘laws,’ that scientific communities should adopt if the competitive efforts of 
their members are to advance the growth of knowledge. 
  
2. The ‘Invisible Hand’ in Markets and in Science 
The main thrust of the economics of science is to draw attention to the fact that a 
naturalistic outlook at the social process of science need not at all imply the kind of 
relativism that some authors have concluded from it, nor must it be in conflict with 
traditional methodological principles of objective science. By applying the Smithean 
invisible-hand logic of explicitly distinguishing between the motivation of the 
individual agents participating in a social process and the social function that is served 
by the process, the economics of science shows that, just as in markets self-interested 
economic agents are led to advance the common good, the social enterprise of science 
may lead self-interested and socially biased researchers to serve the advancement of 
objective scientific knowledge.
2 
  The economics of science can draw support for its claims from a number of 
studies that rely on invisible-hand type arguments in order to rebut the relativist 
conclusions that the sociology of scientific knowledge seemed to imply. Among the 
first to do so was Michael Polanyi who, in his 1962 paper on “The Republic of 
                                                 
2 As W. Hands (2001: 355f.) notes, the “economic turn” in science theory serves “to reconcile the 
interest-ladenness of scientific activity with the cognitive virtues of science” by showing, in the spirit 
of the economic paradigm, “how individually self-interested agents can, within the context of certain 
institutional structures, bring about a result that is simultaneously (1) socially desirable and (2) not the 
intention of any individual agent or group of agents.” – See also Zamora Bonilla (2002: 301). 
  2Science,” portrayed science as a field that exemplifies the principle of spontaneous 
coordination by mutual adjustment (Polanyi 1962: 55), a field in which the “self-
coordination of independent initiatives leads to a joint result which is unpremeditated 
by any of those who bring it about” (ibid.), but is, instead, “guided as by ‘an invisible 
hand’” (ibid.). Referring to Adam Smith’s invocation of the ‘invisible hand’ Polanyi 
explicitly pointed out the similarities between the self-coordination in science and 
“the self-coordination achieved by producers and consumers operating in a market” 
(ibid.: 56).
3 
  Following Polanyi’s lead the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1975: 37) 
has used the “academic market place” metaphor in order to characterize the workings 
of competitive constraints in science as a social process. “The collective order of 
science,” Bourdieu (ibid.: 33f.) argues, “is built up in and through the competitive 
anarchy of self-interested actions, each agent finding himself dominated – as is the 
whole group – by the seemingly incoherent criss-crossing of individual strategies.”
4 
  In a major treatise on “Science as a Process” David L. Hull (1988: 3f.) has 
supported the view that the “objectivity that matters so much in science is not 
primarily a characteristic of individual scientists but of scientific communities.” 
According to Hull, it is the way science its organized as a “system of mutual use and 
checking motivated by self-interest” (ibid.: 357) that brings about “the coincidence 
between the professional interests of individual scientists to gain credit and the 
institutional goal of science to increase our knowledge of the empirical world” (ibid.). 
In seeking, via their publications, recognition for their own views, scientists are 
induced to cooperate by recognizing the works of others that lend support to their 
own views
5 as well as to compete by critically examining the work of their 
competitors.
6 It is the cooperative-competitive interaction among self-interested, 
                                                 
3 Polanyi (1962: 56): “I am suggesting, in fact, that the coordinating functions of the market are but a 
special case of coordination by mutual adjustment. In the case of science, adjustment takes place by 
taking note of the published results of other scientists; while in the case of the market, mutual 
adjustment is mediated by a system of prices broadcasting current exchange relations, which make 
supply meet demand.” 
4 Bourdieu (1975: 32): “The scientific field always included a measure of social arbitrariness …; but 
this does not prevent the inherent logic of the field … from bringing about, under certain constraints, a 
systematic diversion of ends whereby the pursuit of private scientific interests … continuously operates 
to the advantage of the progress of science.” 
5 Hull (1988: 319): “One cannot gain support from a particular work unless one cites it, and this 
citation automatically confers worth on the work cited and detracts from one’s own originality.” 
6 Hull (1988: 4): “Scientists rarely refute their own hypotheses. … Their fellow scientists will be happy 
to expose these hypotheses to severe testing.” – Hull (1997: 121f.): “Scientists … do get credit for 
discovering mistakes in the work of others.” 
  3recognition-seeking scientists that, as Hull (ibid.: 354) notes, “has very much the 
appearance of providing ‘hidden-hand’ explanations of the success of science.” 
Without explicitly invoking the invisible-hand metaphor but employing extensively 
the formal apparatus of economic modeling, Philip Kitcher (1993) has worked out a 
thorough critique of “the notion that one can infer directly from the existence of social 
pressures and nonepistemic motivations the conclusion that science does not advance” 
(1993: 388). The progressive characteristics of science, so Kitcher argues, are not 
dependent on the truth-love and objectivity of individual scientists but are due to its 
institutional structures that channels “our efforts towards community goals” (ibid.: 
351).
7 
  Authors who have recently taken up the market analogy and the invisible-hand 
outlook at science include Allan Walstad (2002) who portrays “Science as a Market 
Process” or Thomas C. Leonard (2002: 141) who makes a “case for seeing science as 
a kind of invisible-hand process.”
8 Others have cautioned, though, that the science-as-
market analogy may well be misleading, either because it tends to distract attention 
from characteristic differences between the ways in which competitive forces work in 
science by contrast to markets, or because it invites an inappropriate generalization of  
theoretical concepts of economics. The first objection has been voiced, for instance, 
by James M. Buchanan who argues that it is “improper, even metaphorically, to 
conceptualize scientists as ‘trading’” (Buchanan 2001c: 158), or by Philip Mirowski 
(2004: 60) who notes that “the act of formal acknowledgment of published work does 
not look much like a price system.” A more extensive argument along these lines has 
been elaborated by Max Albert (2004; 2006) who points out that, by contrast to 
markets, in science the driving force of competition is not the exchange between 
producers and customers but the mutual recognition and checking between producers 
(M. Albert 2004: 128).
9 The second objection has been raised, for instance, by James 
                                                 
7 Hands (2001: 367) describes Kitcher’s work as “the most influential and most self-conscious attempt 
by a philosopher of science to enlist economics in an effort to salvage scientific rationality and 
normative epistemology from the threat of relativism and social constructivism.” – For a discussion on 
Kitcher’s approach see also Mirowski (2004: 99ff.). 
8 Referring to earlier contributions that apply invisible-hand type reasoning to science Leonard (2002: 
154f.) notes: “What unifies these various projects is the idea that science is successful not because real 
scientists are selfless truth seekers, but because science is socially organized in an epistemically 
beneficial way – showing how (and under what circumstances) epistemically impure scientists can 
produce epistemically good outcomes.” 
9 M. Albert (2006: 25): “While scientific competition shows some similarities to competition in 
markets, there are two important differences. First, the basic transaction in science is not an exchange 
  4R. Wible who questions the appropriateness of the science-as-market analogy on the 
ground that the economist’s typical theoretical outlook at markets cannot be applied to 
“the market place of ideas” (Wible 1998: 141), because science is “an evolutionary 
process which cannot be conceived in any manner as a sophisticated extension of any 
of the equilibrium theories of economic competition” (ibid.: 227).
10  
  The two kinds of objections underscore the need to qualify the science-as-
market analogy, yet they are not meant to reject an invisible-hand approach to science. 
They either point to differences in the ways in which the ‘invisible hand’ works in 
science compared to markets, namely through competition for recognition in the 
scientific community rather than via competition for paying customers.
11 Or they 
point to limitations of equilibrium constructs as models for invisible-hand processes, 
limitations that may affect their applicability not only to science but to markets as 
well. When Wible argues that “as an evolutionary social process” science cannot be 
adequately interpreted in terms of the “presumption of equilibrium” (ibid.: 230),
12 this 
argument may well be generalized to markets as evolutionary social processes. In fact, 
one may argue, as Wolfgang Kerber (2006a: 458f.; 2006b: 3ff.) does, that what 
justifies drawing an analogy between market and science is exactly that both can be 
viewed as evolutionary processes of knowledge creation. 
  Drawing on Friedrich A. Hayek’s (1978) concept of competition as a 
discovery procedure and on Karl R. Popper’s (1963) notion of the growth of scientific 
knowledge by conjectures and refutations Kerber argues that competition in markets 
can be interpreted in analogy to science as a process in which alternative conjectures – 
in this case, conjectures about consumer preferences and effective ways of meeting 
them – are put forward and subjected to systematic testing – in this case, the ultimate 
test of consumer choice. As Kerber (2006a: 458) puts it, “market competition 
primarily should be seen as a process of parallel experimenting, in which firms 
                                                                                                                                            
(no-exchange condition). … Second, production decisions are not governed by the evaluations of final 
consumers (producer sovereignty).” 
10 Wible (1998: 230): “Scientific competition cannot be described with economic theories of 
competitive equilibrium. Science is an evolutionary process fraught with flaws, imperfections, and 
other problems due to the public good nature of scientific theories. Science as a process is not an 
equilibrium process.” 
11 Stephan (1996: 1206) notes that in science a reward structure based on priority in the discovery of 
new knowledge “offers non-market based incentives for producing the public good ‘knowledge’.” 
12 Separating the invisible-hand explanations from the equilibrium presumption Hull (1997: S118f.) 
notes: “If invisible-hand explanations are limited only to those systems that are moving toward or are at 
equilibrium, then they certainly do not apply very well to the course of science. One of the most 
important features of science is that it changes and, it is hoped, will continue to change. …The history 
of science does not look much like a movement toward equilibrium.” 
  5compete with different hypotheses (conjectures) about good solutions for the 
problems of the demand side and can learn from each other through imitation. … In 
that respect, competition can be seen as a ‘test of hypotheses’ in which knowledge is 
generated and spread by imitation.”
13 That science and markets can both be looked at 
as evolutionary, knowledge-creating processes is likewise suggested when, on the one 
hand, Polanyi (1962) talks about the “Republic of Science” as “a Society of 
Explorers,” “a society that strives towards an unknown future,” and when, on the 
other hand, Hayek (1948b: 101) describes the market process as “a voyage of 
exploration into the unknown, an attempt to discover new ways of doing things better 
than they have been done before.”
14  
 
3. The ‘Invisible Hand’ Within Constitutional Constraints 
The thrust of the science-as-market analogy is that in both realms aggregate social 
outcomes result from processes that can be explained in evolutionary or invisible-
hand terms, i.e. as outcomes that are not brought about by design but emerge as 
unintended byproducts from spontaneous interactions among individuals who pursue 
their own aims. Invisible-hand explanations are of particular interest – and have been 
typically employed – in those instances in which the emergent unintended outcomes 
are in some sense ‘beneficial.’ Yet, so Buchanan (2001b: 99) reminds us, invisible-
hand explanations are per se normatively neutral, they “may be as applicable to 
‘orders’ that are clearly recognized to be undesirable as to those that are recognized to 
be desirable.” Obviously, what kinds of outcomes invisible-hand processes can be 
expected to produce depends on the specific ways in which the ‘invisible hand’ 
works. 
  The burden of invisible-hand explanations is, as Ullmann-Margalit (1978: 
267f.) has noted, in specifying “the process, or mechanism, that aggregates the 
dispersed individual actions into the patterned outcome: it is the degree to which this 
mechanism is explicit … that determines the success and interest of the invisible-hand 
                                                 
13 Kerber (2006a: 458): “The unpredictability of innovations (due to the creativity of human agents), 
the experimental character of competition, and the role of consumers in markets as selectors suggest the 
interpretation of competition processes as evolutionary processes of variation and selection.” 
14 Lavoie (1985: 26) points to the correspondence between Polanyi’s arguments on the ‘republic of 
science’ and Hayek’s arguments on ‘competition as discovery procedure’ when he notes: “Economic 
rivalry among competitors in the market generates knowledge that no rival on his own could have 
possessed in the absence of that rivalry. This, as … Michael Polanyi has shown, is but a special case of 
the way that … progress is attained within the ‘Republic of Science’ … . They are what Hayek calls 
discovery processes.” 
  6explanation.” Without specifying the working mechanisms of an evolutionary, 
invisible-hand process one cannot say anything specific about the nature of the 
outcomes that result. To be sure, one can predict that in all evolutionary processes 
selection will work in favor of ‘the successful,’ yet as long as the selection mechanism 
and the nature of the selection environment are not specified such prediction does not 
tell us more about what characterizes ‘the successful,’ other than that they survive. 
Whether what survives is ‘good’ in terms of some normative standard cannot be said. 
‘The successful’ survives in the evolution of bank-fraud technology just as in the 
evolution of cost-saving technology in the automobile industry. Likewise, all 
evolutionary processes can be said to be knowledge-generating processes, as 
advocates of evolutionary epistemology like Donald T. Campbell and Popper 
emphasize.
15 Yet, whether the knowledge gained in the process serves, in terms of 
some normative standard, ‘good’ purposes cannot be said in the absence of knowledge 
about the selection mechanisms that are at work. The competition among rivaling 
mafia groups generates knowledge as does the competition among scientists.
16 
  In an article entitled “What’s Wrong with Invisible-Hand Explanations?” Hull 
(1997) has defended his invisible-hand account of Science as a Process against the 
charge that it implies an optimistic bias. Conceding that, whether invisible-hand 
processes produce ‘good’ outcomes – as in Adam Smith’s example – or ‘bad’ 
consequences – as in the tragedy of the commons – obviously depends on the specific 
mechanisms that are at work (Hull 1997: 118), Hull argues that his ambition in 
Science as a Process was exactly to specify the mechanisms and to identify the 
conditions that, in the case of science, serve to align “individual ‘selfish’ goals and the 
greater good,” conditions that, as he adds, “are frequently realized in science as it has 
been practiced for the past couple hundred years in the West” (ibid.: 120). 
  Like Hull, most other advocates of an invisible-hand outlook at science 
explicitly note, or take implicitly for granted, that the beneficial working of the 
                                                 
15 According to Campbell (1974: 413) evolutionary epistemology holds “that evolution – even in its 
biological aspects – is a knowledge process, and that the natural-selection paradigm … can be 
generalized to other epistemic activities, such as learning, thought, and science.” – Popper and Eccles 
(1983: 133): “On all three levels of adaptation (the genetic level, the behavioral level, the level of 
scientific theory formation) adaptive changes always start from some given structure. … More or less 
accidental mutations or variations come under the selection pressure of mutual competition, or under 
external pressure which eliminates the less successful variations.”  
16 See Kerber (2006a: 457) for a more detailed discussion of how, in markets, “the institutional 
framework influences the dynamics and direction of the generation and spreading of new knowledge 
and therefore channels the evolutionary knowledge-generating competition process.” 
  7evolutionary process of science is contingent on the presence of conditions that serve 
to channel the agents’ competitive efforts into socially productive directions.
17 They 
recognize, in particular, that in science, as in all social  evolutionary processes, 
socially enforced rules constitute an essential part of the selection environment and 
that, accordingly, the ways in which the ‘invisible-hand’ works will depend on the 
nature of the framework of rules or the ‘constitution’ within which the process of 
science unfolds.
18 They recognize, in other words, that the ‘invisible hand’ in science 
– not different from the ‘invisible hand’ in markets – operates under constitutional 
constraints, that it is a ‘constitutionally constrained invisible hand.’ As Leonard 
(2002: 143) puts it: “Scientific rules, and the means of their enforcement, constitute 
the invisible-hand mechanism,” they induce “scientific actors with worldly goals to 
make choices that (sometimes) lead to epistemologically good scientific outcomes.”
19 
  The game metaphor has been often applied to markets as well as to science in 
order to emphasize their spontaneous as well as rule-guided nature. Hayek is known 
for insisting that the market economy can best be understood as the “game of 
catallaxy,” a game that, as he notes, “proceeds, like all games, according to rules 
guiding the actions of individual participants” (Hayek 1976: 71). An often quoted 
prominent example in the science literature is Popper’s reference to “the game of 
empirical science” in his 1935 Logik der Forschung where he argues that science is in 
similar ways constituted by its rules as is a game like chess. Following Popper’s lead 
Jesús Zamora Bonilla has recently elaborated in some detail “the notion that scientific 
research can be described as a game which is played according to some rules” (2008: 
263), applying a constitutional economics and game theoretic perspective to 
“methodological norms … as rules defining a competitive game” (2002: 300). 
  Market and science are games of competition. In both realms, the engine that 
drives the evolutionary invisible-hand process is the competing ambitions of reward-
seeking agents. And in both realms competition is not unbounded but is 
constitutionally constrained, subject to rules that can be more or less suitable in 
channeling the participants’ ambitions in socially productive directions. In the same 
way in which the economic constitution can be studied in its effects on the market 
                                                 
17 Leonard (2002: 142, 153): “Strictly speaking, invisible-hand processes can also lead to collectively 
bad rather than good unintended consequences. … If it is to have any explanatory force, the term 
‘invisible hand’ must be more than a label for a black-box process.” 
18 Hull and Polanyi refer to such rules when they speak of the “conventions of science” (Hull 1997: 
120) and the “professional standards of science” (Polanyi 1962: 57). 
19 Leonard (2002: 160): “Like markets, science is successful because it has robust institutions.” 
  8process, the rules of the game of science can be studied in their working properties, 
and just as in the case of markets in the case of science the question can be asked of 
which rules promise to be most suitable in reconciling the participants’ self-interest 
with the social function of the enterprise. Such exploration into the constitution of 
science is, according to Wade Hands (2001: 361), the subject of the “economics of 
scientific knowledge” which inquires into the question of whether the behavior of 
scientists and the institutions of science work together to “produce scientific products 
that are cognitively efficient or optimal (or if they are not optimal, how the institutions 
might be changed in order to improve epistemic efficiency).” And Kitcher sees the 
role of “social epistemology” in undertaking such inquiry, namely “to identify the 
properties of epistemically well-designed social systems, that is, to specify the 
conditions under which a group of individuals … succeed, through their interactions, 
in generating a progressive sequence of consensus practices” (Kitcher 1993: 303).
20  
  Authors like Ian Jarvie (2001) and Hans Albert (2004: 30f.; 2006: 121f.) credit 
Popper with having initiated a constitutional turn in the philosophy of science by 
drawing attention to the role that methodological rules play as constitutional 
constraints in science as a social institution.
21 In contrast to a sociology of knowledge 
that sees the objectivity of science in jeopardy because of socially biased interests and 
perceptions of scientists, Popper has argued that “scientific objectivity” does not 
depend on the individual scientist’s impartiality or objectivity but is a “product of the 
social or public character of the scientific method” (Popper 1971: 220), resulting from 
the “friendly-hostile co-operation of many scientists” (ibid.: 217).
22 It rests on “the 
public character of science and of its institutions which imposes a mental discipline 
upon the individual scientist” (Popper 1994: 155f.). 
                                                 
20 Hands (2001: 367): “Economists are interested in finding out the arrangement of our social 
institutions that is most conducive to economic efficiency; Kitcher’s normative philosophical project is 
to find out the arrangement of our cognitive institutions that is most conducive to epistemic efficiency 
(that best encourages the formation of reliable beliefs).” – Bartley (1990: 93) assigns a similar role to 
epistemology when he notes: “Epistemology … must seek to identify what contributes to the growth of 
knowledge, and what stands in its way. It must seek to understand the principles underlying the 
competition of ideas in the marketplace of ideas, and to identify ideas and institutions that do, and that 
could, contribute to such a competitive market, and those that hinder it.” 
21 Jarvie (2001: 35) speaks of “a ‘social turn’ in Popper’s thought” and notes “that insoluble difficulties 
in the ‘pure’ logic of science led Popper to propose, in 1935, that we treat science as a social institution 
incorporating a set of rules, or methodology, designed to advance us towards agreed-upon aims.” 
According to  Jarvie (ibid.: 36) Popper’s Logik der Forschung “contains profound and original ideas on 
the social character and constitution of science” (ibid.: 36). 
22 In a similar spirit Hayek (1948a: 15) notes: “Human Reason, with a capital R, does not exist in the 
singular, as given or available to any particular person, … but must be conceived as an interpersonal 
process in which everyone’s contribution is tested and corrected by others.” 
  9  In terms of the “institutional … analysis of the conditions of progress” that 
Popper (ibid.: 154) advocates, methodological rules can be understood as conventions 
or ‘rules of the game of science’ that serve to advance the growth of knowledge. In 
this sense Popper’s falsificationist methodology is not meant as a descriptive account 
of the history of science or an empirical statement about the motivation that drives 
individual scientists. It is, instead, about constitutional choice. It is meant as an 
answer to the question of what rules of scientific practice should be adopted if one 
wants the process of science to best serve its function of improving our knowledge 
about the world.
23 With his emphasis on falsifiability Popper recommends a scientific 
practice that seeks to advance the growth of knowledge through the elimination of 
error, a recommendation that naturally follows from his evolutionary outlook at 
knowledge processes. The engine that, from such outlook, drives the growth of 
knowledge is a competition among alternative conjectures that facilitates the 
elimination of hypotheses that conflict with evidence. And the social strategy that 
makes this engine work effectively is adopting rules of scientific practice that 
encourage such competition (Popper 1994: 154f.).
24 As Jarvie (2001: 29) puts it, the 
“social content of Popper’s philosophy of science was institutionalization of the 
decision to maximize falsifiability,” an institutionalization in the form of 
methodological rules that “create incentives to discover and to expose error” (ibid.: 
41).
25  
  Commenting on Popper’s institutional approach to methodology H. Albert has 
stressed the instrumental or ‘technological’ nature of methodological rules. According 
to Albert, with its constitutional interpretation Popper has pointed out that 
methodology can be viewed as social technology.
26 It is concerned with the social-
technological problem of identifying suitable rules for science as a social enterprise 
                                                 
23 Jarvie (2001: 13): “Popper offered neither sociological nor historical generalizations about science. 
He offered methodological rules as legislated norms, not empirical ones.” – The validity of Popper’s 
methodology as a constitutional recommendation for how the ‘cumulativeness’ of science can be 
promoted is not affected by Thomas Kuhn’s (1970: 96) doubts about whether the history of science 
confirms “the ideal that our image of its cumulativeness has suggested.” 
24 Jarvie (2001: 43f.): “Popper suggests adopting a supreme or meta-methodological social rule not to 
avoid falsification; in order to monitor this rule, co-inquirers must be free to check one another’s 
claims.” 
25 Jarvie (ibid.: 52): “Falsifiability is not self-justifying like a tautological truth. It has to be adopted, a 
decision that is taken in order to foster certain aims.” 
26 H. Albert (2004: 31): “Meines Erachtens lassen sich Poppers Vorschläge am besten technologisch 
interpretieren, also als Versuche einer an der Zielsetzung des Erkenntnisfortschritts orientierten 
Sozialtechnologie.” 
  10that seeks to advance the growth of knowledge.
27 Such concern with the constitution 
of science is, as H. Albert (2005: 173; 2006: 124ff.) argues, but one instance of the 
more general social-technological inquiry into how social arrangements can be framed 
by constitutions that guide the participating agents’ interaction in ways that serve 
intended purposes. In this sense, methodology can be viewed as a counterpart to the 
“science of political economy” in the spirit of Adam Smith, i.e. as a science concerned 
with “designing appropriate legal and constitutional constraints” (Buchanan 2001a: 
52). 
  Like social-technological recommendations in general, the methodological 
recommendations can be critically examined in terms of their instrumental suitability 
in serving the aims that they are supposed to promote. As statements about what the 
rules of science should be they address a normative problem, but they are ‘normative’ 
only in the sense of hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives. In the same way 
in which social-technological recommendations in general inform their addresses 
about ‘social tools’ that can help them to better achieve certain aims, methodological 
recommendations tell the addressees to whom they are directed what rules they should 
adopt if they wish to advance the knowledge-generating capacity of science. 
  Hypothetical imperatives are statements about matters of fact. As empirical 
conjectures about how a supposed goal can be achieved they are refuted if the ‘tool’ 
that they recommend is in fact not suitable for the stated purpose. And they are 
ineffective if their addressees do not wish to pursue the goal the ‘tool’ is 
recommended for. It is in reference to their conjectural nature that Jarvie (2001: 44) 
comments on Popper’s methodological proposals: “Both the rationale of the 
methodological choices and whether the choices will in fact foster the desired aims 
are matters on which there can be reasoned dispute.” 
 
4. The Constitution of Science as a Social Contract 
Constitutional recommendations must be addressed to someone. In order to be of 
relevance the goals that they suppose must be those the addressees can be expected to 
share. And in order for such recommendations to be valid the rules that they propose 
                                                 
27 In his 1942 article “The Normative Structure of Science” R.K. Merton interprets the institutions of 
science in a similar social-technological sense: “The institutional goal of science is the extension of 
certified knowledge. … The institutional imperatives (mores) derive from the goal and the methods. 
The entire structure of technical and moral norms implements the final objective.” (Quoted from 
Walstad 2002: 31). 
  11must be in fact capable of advancing the supposed goal. In other words, in order to 
have an impact the authors of constitutional proposals must provide arguments to their 
addressees for why they should consider the supposed aim desirable, and why they 
should consider the proposed rules to be suitable instruments for promoting that aim. 
  A constitutional economics that inquires into how “the legal framework, the 
‘laws and institutions,’ of the marketplace (can) be designed so as to further the 
‘general interest’” (Buchanan 2001a: 52) advances constitutional proposals as 
conjectures about what rules the members of a relevant constituency might voluntarily 
agree on to their mutual advantage. Adopting a contractarian perspective, it analyzes 
constitutional choices in terms of a social contract among those whose behavior is to 
be governed by the adopted rules, and whose voluntary agreement is the ultimate test 
for whether or not the proposed rules are to their mutual benefit.
28 The principal task 
of such contractarian-constitutional inquiry is to identify common interests that the 
members of the relevant constituency can be expected to share and to identify rules 
that are suitable for advancing these common interests. 
  In their capacity as constitutional recommendations, methodological proposals 
must also be addressed to someone, and in order for them to have an impact their 
addressees must be convinced that the recommended rules are capable of fostering a 
goal that they share. The natural addressees of proposals for the rules of science are 
the members of the scientific community who are invited to agree on the 
recommended rules as the constitution of the enterprise they are engaged in. In 
Jarvie’s (2001: 47) reading Popper’s methodological proposals can be interpreted in 
this sense, namely as suggesting “that science is to be seen as an interested group that 
shares an aim and legislates conventions for itself in order the better to pursue that 
aim.”
29 And even a contractarian interpretation is invited when, according to Jarvie 
(ibid.: 44), Popper’s arguments imply “that we treat the refutability criterion as a 
proposal for a suitable agreement or convention,” an agreement by which the 
                                                 
28 Respecting the addressees as the ultimate judges on what serves their interests does not require one to 
take their proximate preference for rules as the ultimate word. Because of their limited insights into the 
actual working properties of alternative rules the addressees’ proximate preference may be in favor of 
rules that they would not wish to adopt if they knew what they will produce. By informing them about 
the working properties of rules the constitutional advisor may cause them to revise their proximate 
preference. 
29 Jarvie (2001: 68): “For the methodological rules Popper proposed … are directed to science 
conceived of as a general and abstract public. They enjoin: here, if you want to respect and advance 
these aims, is a set of proposed procedures. … Popper’s arguments and rules will then seem directed to 
men and women of good will who want to advance the project of science.” 
  12scientific citizenry self-legislates its constitution.
30 Interpreted in this sense, Popper’s 
proposal presupposes that the members of the scientific citizenry share a common 
interest in the advancement of knowledge and that what needs to be argued for is the 
suitability of the recommended convention in furthering that aim. 
  Adopting a constitutional economics perspective Zamora Bonilla and José L. 
Ferreira (Ferreira and Zamora Bonilla 2006) explicitly advocate a contractarian 
approach to methodology.
31 The authors share with invisible-hand accounts of science 
the assumption “that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically 
behaving agents” (Ferreira and Zamora Bonilla 2006: 191), they emphasize however 
that, by contrast to approaches “that describe scientific order as the emergent outcome 
of some market-like mechanism” (ibid.: 194), their contractarian approach looks at 
methodological rules as constitutional constraints “which researchers would prefer to 
impose on themselves” (ibid.: 192).
32 The focus of Ferreira’s and Zamora Bonilla’s 
contractarian outlook is on the constitutional preferences that “researchers interested 
in their own reputation, and perhaps in other epistemic goals” (ibid.: 194) can be 
expected to share, and they seek to show “that recognition-seeking scientists will have 
an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of high 
epistemic value” (ibid.: 191). 
  While Ferreira and Zamora Bonilla emphasize the difference between his 
contractarian and invisible-hand accounts of ‘scientific order,’ on closer examination 
the contrast between the two does not appear quite as definite as they suggest. As has 
been noted before, most of the advocates of invisible-hand accounts of the process of 
science acknowledge, implicitly if not explicitly, that the beneficial working of the 
‘invisible hand’ is contingent on the presence of rules of the game that guide the 
competing scientists’ ambitions into productive directions. Once the role of the rules 
                                                 
30 Jarvie (2001: 218) speaks of “the scientific citizenry’s submission to methodological rules.” Because 
they are “self-legislated conventions” (ibid.: 47), methodological rules are, as Jarvie (ibid.: 52) notes, 
“more like the laws of the land and less like the (more stable and finite) set of rules that constitute 
chess.”  
31 A similar outlook has been proposed by Zamora-Bonilla in an earlier paper in which he supports the 
view that “the methodological rules of a scientific discipline can be understood as the result of an 
agreement between the members of that discipline” (Zamora Bonilla 2002: 319). - See also Zamora 
Bonilla (2008). 
32 In his earlier paper Zamora Bonilla (2002: 309) had argued that, “according to the contractarian 
approach, the ‘constitution’ of a scientific discipline should be understood as an exchange of 
constraints on the acceptance of scientific statements,” and that methodological rules can be viewed as 
such constitutional constraints on which “rational recognition-seeking scientists can reach a collective 
agreement …, especially if the choice is made ‘under a veil of ignorance’, i.e., before knowing what 
theory will be proposed by each scientist” (ibid.: 300). 
  13of the game is acknowledged, however, we must obviously distinguish between two 
versions of invisible-hand accounts, one more modest, the other more ambitious. The 
modest version claims that, given adequate rules of the game of science, the invisible 
hand of competition among recognition-seeking scientists can be shown to produce 
epistemically efficient outcomes. It remains silent, though, with regard to the question 
of how the rules of the game come about. By contrast, the more ambitious version 
makes the additional claim that the rules that make for an efficient game of science 
can themselves be explained in invisible-hand terms.  
  Since they remain silent about how the rules of science are established, modest 
invisible-hand accounts can be perfectly compatible with a rule-focused contractarian 
account. If there is a conflict, it can only exist between the latter and invisible-hand 
accounts of the more ambitious variety. Yet, even such conflict need not necessarily 
exist. In fact, whether it exists or not depends on the specific explanatory claims that 
are associated with a contractarian approach, claims that, similar to the two versions 
of invisible-hand accounts, may come in a weak and a strong version. In its weak 
version a contractarian approach merely claims to show that scientists have a common 
constitutional interest in rules that make for an efficient game of science, and that 
they could be expected to agree on such rules if they were to collectively choose a 
constitution for their common enterprise. It does not claim that an explicit agreement 
is needed for such rules to come into effect, or that the rules of the game of science 
are actually based on a social contract. What distinguishes the strong version from a 
weak contractarian approach is that it invokes such explicit agreement in its account 
of the constitution of science. 
  While the strong contractarian and the ambitious invisible-hand version are 
clearly competing explanatory accounts, a weak contractarian approach may well be 
compatible with an ambitious invisible-hand account of ‘scientific order,’ a possibility 
that Ferreira and Zamora Bonilla do not explicitly recognize even though most of their 
arguments appear to be more in line with the weak than with the strong contractarian 
version.
33 To show, as they do, that scientists can be assumed to have good reasons 
for sharing a common constitutional interest in epistemically efficient rules does 
                                                 
33 Not more than the weak version appears to be implied when Zamora Bonilla (2008: 265) notes about 
his contractarian-constitutionalist approach: “From a game-theoretic perspective, two different but 
interrelated sets of questions emerge once we interpret scientific norms as the rules of a game: First, 
what will scientists’ behavior be once certain norms have been established? And second, what norms 
would they prefer to have if they were given a choice?” 
  14obviously not imply that such rules must come into effect by deliberate agreement. 
The very fact that they are in scientists’ common constitutional interest may just as 
well be said to facilitate their spontaneous emergence. This is what M. Albert (2004) 
seems to have in mind when he supposes that the rules that govern competition in 
science are themselves generated in the process of competition,
34 and that 
methodological rules that represent suitable tools for the advancement of knowledge 
have not only a good chance of prevailing but are also incentive-compatible in the 
sense that scientists will by and large have an interest in complying with them (ibid.: 
133). The reason is, so Albert argues, that scientists in order to play the game of 
science need to coordinate on some rules and that methodological rules that provide 
an effective technology for arriving at valid theories represent a natural focal point for 
the coordination problem that the scientific community has to solve (ibid.: 148).
35 
Even though Albert does not refer to such contractarian interpretation, rules that can 
be assumed to be in scientists’ common constitutional interest would certainly qualify 
as focal points in a process of spontaneous coordination.
36  
  The notion that epistemically efficient rules represent a focal point for the 
coordination problem that scientists face appears to be also implied when Hull (1988: 
320) argues: “Once one identifies the operative norms of research science, the 
explanation for the high frequency with which individuals adhere to these norms 
becomes obvious. It is in their own self-interest to do so.” Such emphasis on the self-
enforcing nature of the rules of science is perfectly compatible with a contractarian 
approach that points to scientists’ common constitutional interest in such rules.
37 
 
5. Competition for Resources and Multi-Level Selection 
In markets and in science the invisible hand of competition and the rules of the game 
must work together to produce efficient outcomes. How well markets and science 
work as social systems, depends on the quality of the rules, or the constitution, on 
                                                 
34 M. Albert (2004: 130): “Wissenschaft als Institution ist ein Wettbewerb, der auf bestimmten Regeln 
beruht, die sich in diesem Wettbewerb selbst herausgebildet haben.” 
35 M. Albert (2004: 143): “Methodologische Regeln, die als Technologien zur Gewinnung wahrer 
Theorien gedeutet warden können, bieten sich als Fokalpunkt des Koordinationsspiels an.” 
36 Kitcher (1993: 305) compares the coordination problem scientists face with the problem faced by “a 
philosopher-monarch, interested in organizing the scientific work force so as to promote the collective 
achievement of significant truths.” Since, as Kitcher (ibid.) adds, “science, of course, has no such 
benevolent dictator,” the required coordination must be brought by the ‘invisible hand’ or by an explicit 
social contract. 
37 Hull (1988: 394): “Scientists need very little encouragement to adhere to the institutional norms of 
science. … Scientists adhere to the norms of science because it is in their self-interest to do so.”  
  15which they are based. And the quality of their constitutions is measured in terms of 
their capacity to advance the respective aims that markets and science are supposed to 
serve. The clue to the beneficial working of the competitive processes in both realms 
is that they are governed by rules that align the individual participants’ self-interested 
ambitions with the social purpose of the enterprise.
38 
  Since Adam Smith’s critique of the ‘mercantilist system’ and his argument for 
the “simple system of natural liberty” it has been a widely shared understanding 
among economists that the proper measuring rod for the performance of markets is 
how well they serve the interests of consumers, a notion that has been condensed in 
the concept of consumer sovereignty.
39 To Adam Smith it was self-evident that 
consumer sovereignty is the adequate ideal for an economic constitution, because, so 
he argued, we produce in order to consume and should, therefore, assign priority to 
consumer interests over producer interests in choosing the rules of the economic game 
(Smith 1981: 660). He presumed that – translated in the language of constitutional 
economics – it is in the common constitutional interest of all participants to have the 
economic game they play based on rules that give priority to their interests as 
consumers, rather than to the interests in protectionist privileges that they may harbor 
in their capacity as producers. 
  If science as a social system is supposed to advance the growth of knowledge, 
the quality of the rules of the game of science is to be measured in terms of their 
capacity to further this aim. Most of the authors whose comments on the issue have 
been reviewed above not only take for granted that to improve our knowledge of the 
world is, indeed, the intended function of empirical science as a social enterprise, they 
also appear to presume, implicitly if not explicitly, that the participants in the game of 
science share a common constitutional interest in epistemically efficient rules of the 
game. Furthermore, these authors seem to be also in essential agreement that such 
rules have a good chance of prevailing in the competitive process and to be 
spontaneously enforced to a sufficient degree by the mutual monitoring among 
recognition-seeking scientists. Hull (1997: 122) describes science as “the only self-
policing system that actually polices itself to any significant extent.” 
                                                 
38 As Hull (1997: 121) notes: “Although appeals to duty certainly have some effect, it always helps if 
individuals do not have to sacrifice their individual goals for the good of the group. Social systems 
work much better when virtue and individual benefit go hand in hand.” 
39 For a more detailed discussion see Vanberg (2005: 35ff.). 
  16  From the self-policing nature of science and the fact that, as Polanyi (1962: 
60) puts it, “scientists exercise their authority over each other,” M. Albert (2006: 25) 
concludes that science is characterized by a kind of “producer sovereignty,” by 
contrast to the consumer sovereignty that reigns in markets. In science, so Albert 
argues, it is the producers themselves who by their mutual monitoring pass the 
relevant judgment on each others’ work, while in markets the choices of consumers 
are the ultimate verdict on success and failure (consumer sovereignty).
40 While such 
‘producer sovereignty’ surely exists, it can only work, of course, within the limits 
imposed by the need of scientists to “seek resources from society at large to support 
their research” (Walstad 2002: 38). Science as a social system does not generate 
endogenously the resources it needs for its functioning. Scientists need support from 
resource-providers. It is this need that, as Walstad (ibid.) puts it, “connects the 
purposes of scientists with those of people in the wider community,” and, thereby, 
imposes constraints on the ways in which the self-coordination among producers in 
Polanyi’s republic of science may operate.
41 
  That in science the competition for recognition among peers is tied up with the 
competition for resources is an obvious fact. In order to be able to participate in the 
competition for recognition scientists need to secure resources, and this introduces 
another level of competition that has its own rules. Accordingly, the question arises of 
how the two kinds of competition are related to each other, in particular in regard to 
their respective impact on the epistemic efficiency of the scientific process.
42 Even if 
the fact that “people in society at large value the technological advances that science 
makes possible” (Walstad 2002: 38) may seem to support a harmonious relation 
between the two because of the “correlation between the epistemic and the pragmatic 
                                                 
40 See also M. Albert (2004: 143f.). In a similar sense Bourdieu (1975: 23) points out that “in a highly 
autonomous scientific field, a particular producer cannot expect recognition of the value of his products 
… from anyone except other producers” and that, in this regard, “the scientific field functions in 
exactly the same way as a highly autonomous artistic field.” – As Hull (1988: 306) notes: “Scientists 
must seek first and foremost to have their work accepted by their peers, not by government officials, 
science reporters, or the general public.” 
41 Referring to the selection forces that result from the need to secure resources G.E. Allen (1991: 699) 
has commented on Hull’s invisible-hand account: “Hull admits to being a partial realist – there is some 
sort of real world out there, after all against which competing scientists test their theories. But often 
more important, at least in the short run, are social and political factors such as the ability of individuals 
or groups to corner research funds, attract graduate students, and gain control of key journals or 
professional societies.” 
42 Stephan (1996: 1231): “Given the role that resources play in scientific discovery, it is important to 
understand more fully how scientific outcomes relate to the way governments and philanthropic 
organizations provide resources.” 
  17values of theories” (Ferreira and Zamora Bonilla 2006: 205),
43 such harmonious 
relation is by no means guaranteed. Whether the rules according to which scientists 
compete for recognition, and the rules that govern the competition for resources, are 
well aligned, and whether they support or inhibit each other in promoting the growth 
of knowledge, is an empirical matter.
44 
  Comparable to the case of markets, in science forces of competitive selection 
work at several levels, and the working properties of the entire system will depend on 
the degree to which the rules of competition at the different levels are in harmony 
with each other and with the purpose of the overall enterprise. In the case of markets, 
the ways in which rewards are assigned within a company to the various participants 
in the corporate enterprise will have an obvious effect on how well the firm performs 
relative to its competitors. What a firm needs to do in order to perform well in its 
environment will, in turn, depend on the rules that political authorities at various 
levels – local, regional, national, and supra-national – define for the economic game, 
and on the selection forces the firm faces in a global market environment. Likewise, 
in the case of science, the ways in which research institutes, universities and 
professional associations assign positions, promotions, rewards and honors to their 
members will have an obvious effect on the ways in which scientists compete with 
each other. And what kind of internal reward structure will help to make research 
institutes, universities and professional associations, in turn, successful in the 
environment in which they have to compete for resources will depend, among other 
things, on the nature of the legal-institutional framework within which they operate, 
including the rules that define the terms of competition for government funds, for 
research grants and for other forms of financial support.  
  In evolutionary biology the concept of ‘vicarious selection’ has been 
introduced to describe a harmonious relation of the selection principles that operate at 
                                                 
43 Zamora Bonilla (2008: 271): “However, as long as the results of a discipline have some practical 
consequences, on which scientists payoffs depend, it is sensible to assume that a discipline whose rules 
of inference and observation lead systematically to mistaken practical conclusions will cease to get the 
resources it needs. So, the members of a scientific discipline will have an interest, if only for this 
reason, in collectively adopting a system of rules which is efficient in the production of 
(approximately) true statements.” 
44 Jarvie (2001: 66) notes in reference to Popper’s methodological proposal: “Election to 
professorships, elections in national academies and in learned societies, the selection of journal editors, 
were all conducted by sets of rules that bore little or no relation to Popper’s methodological and 
procedural rules. It is not at all clear that the weight of these offices and their electoral rules was always 
brought to bear to move in the direction Popper intended, namely, critical open-mindedness (especially 
if Kuhn is to be believed).” 
  18different levels of a multi-level evolutionary system. Generalizing the concept, the 
selection principle that operates within a subunit of a more inclusive system – such as, 
e.g., a firm within a national market, a university within a national university system, 
a national economy within a global market, a national academic system in a world-
wide scientific environment – can be said to be ‘vicarious’ if it selects in favor of 
characteristics that enhance the capacity of the unit to successfully compete in its own 
selection environment. The reward structure within a firm is, in this sense, ‘vicarious’ 
if it guides the self-interest ambitions of its members in directions that strengthen the 
firm’s ability to compete with its rivals. Analogously, a university operates as a 
‘vicarious selector’ if its internal rules of competition are in line with the competitive 
constraints it faces in its environment. And the same logic applies to the relation 
between the rules of competition that exist in any system and the selection principles 
that operate in its more inclusive environment, be it the relation between a 
university’s internal rules of operation and the legal-institutional environment it faces 
at the national level, or be it the relation between a national economic constitution and 
the selection forces that work in global markets. 
  Since sub-systems, whether in markets or in science, that operate on ‘non-
vicarious’ or ‘dysfunctional’ selection principles are at a disadvantage in competition 
with systems that operate as vicarious selectors, there will be a tendency, at least in 
the long run, for sub-systems to adopt internal rules of competition that are in line 
with the competitive constraints that they face in their more inclusive selection 
environment. This does not rule out the possibility, though, that systems – be it firms, 
universities, national economies, academic professions, etc. – that operate internally 
on rules of competition that are not in line with those that prevail in the more 
inclusive selection environment may not survive for more or less extended periods. 
Accordingly, in science sub-systems may be able to sustain themselves over 
considerable time-periods that operate on selection principles that do not advance the 
growth of knowledge even if in the more inclusive system of science epistemically 
efficient rules of competition are in force. 
  Some authors have suggested that contemporary mainstream economics – 
rather than working as a ‘vicarious selector’ – may be just one such case of a sub-
system in which selection principles prevail that are dysfunctional in the sense of 
encouraging the production of a kind of ‘scientific output’ that is not only of little use 
and interest to the wider community, but also contributes little to the growth of 
  19knowledge of economics as an empirical science. Echoing John Cassidy’s sobering 
report on “The Decline of Economics” that appeared in a 1996 issue of the magazine 
The New Yorker, Bruno Frey (2003: 213) has observed that “non-economists are using 
the results produced in modern economics and its publication system less and less, 
because they judge them to be far from relevant.”
45 Thomas Mayer (1993: 10) arrives 
at the conclusion that economics suffers from an excessive ‘producer sovereignty,’ 
and that it is because of the very lack of feedback from ‘consumers’ that the ‘invisible 
hand’ fails to guide the research efforts of economists into epistemically productive 
directions.
46 Agreeing with Philip Mirowski’s (1989: 381) diagnosis that “the 
pressure to usurp the legitimacy of science has always weighed down economic 
research,” Mayer argues that their desire to “claim a kinship to the hard sciences” 
(ibid.: 15) and to “appear like physicists” (ibid.: 16) has tempted economists to overly 
focus on one of the tools of physics, mathematics, and to allow “formal criteria … to 
invade what should be the domain of empirical science economics” (ibid.: 66).
47 
According to authors like Cassidy, Frey, Mirowski and Mayer it is the desire to raise 
their status by turning their discipline into a branch of applied mathematics that has 
lead economists to adopt selection principles that are counterproductive, both with 
regard to the outside reputation of their profession and with regard to its contribution 
to the growth of knowledge. 
                                                
 
6. Conclusion: The Local Vulnerability and the Global Robustness of Markets 
and Science 
If markets and science can be looked at as multi-level evolutionary systems in the 
sense explained in the previous section, an important distinction can be drawn 
 
45 Frey (2003: 218): “Economics loses its importance for advising governments and becomes 
increasingly less attractive as a field for students.” – Frey specifically targets the refereeing system as 
an inefficient selection principle for journal publications and criticizes its harmful indirect effects, 
because “rankings of individuals, departments and universities in modern economics are based to a 
large extent on publications in refereed journals” (ibid.: 211). – That the refereeing in general has its 
grave deficiencies is suspected by Henneberg (1997: 1) who notes: “It is argued here that peer review 
as now undertaken by most scientific journals stifles scientific communication, slows the advancement 
of knowledge and encourages dishonest behavior among referees.” 
46 Mayer (1993: 10): “The reason for this market failure is that the market is dominated by the 
producers, predominantly academic economists, so that the usual market discipline does not exist. 
Unlike academic researchers in fields such as medicine or law who work for a large market of 
practitioners, academic economists, by and large, write for each other. Hence, their tastes, not the 
consumers’, determine what is produced.” 
47 As Mayer (1993: 20) summarizes his argument: “I have treated the methodology of economics as a 
problem in public choice theory, and discussed how self-interest is likely to bias the methodological 
choices that economists make, particularly in the direction of over-using mathematics and formalism.” 
  20between proximate selectors that producers in markets and scientists face in their 
immediate environment and the more remote and ultimate selectors that, globally and 
in the longer run, determine what counts as success and what as failure in markets and 
in science. How well markets work in the service of consumer preferences, and how 
well science works as a knowledge-generating enterprise will surely depend on the 
extent to which the internal rules of operation and the external constitutional 
environment of business enterprises and scientific organizations are supportive of 
these goals. There are good reasons, though, to suppose that, in markets, consumer 
preferences and, in science, the ‘truth’ – or more modestly phrased: the compatibility 
with the facts – work as effective ultimate selectors, even if the competitive 
constraints that producers and scientists face in their proximate environments may be 
at odds with an economic constitution that promotes consumer sovereignty or an 
epistemically efficient constitution of science.  
  Producers in markets may seek to restrain competition and to exploit 
consumers by cartel agreements, and governments may grant protectionist privileges 
to particular industries at the expense of consumers, but man’s ineradicable interest in 
finding access to the most attractive sources of supply will be a powerful force that 
incessantly works to circumvent, to erode and to overcome the barriers that are put in 
their way. The principles of selection that prevail in research institutes and 
universities, the constraints that national rules and regulations define for scientific 
work, and conventions that come to prevail in professions such as economics may be 
dysfunctional, but man’s ineradicable interest in knowing how the world around him 
works will be an incessant force that tends to select in favor of more informative 
theories, and stubborn reality will be an inescapable ultimate selector between 
conjectures that are compatible with the facts and those that are not.
48 Globally and in 
the long run the capacity of markets to serve consumer interests and the capacity of 
science to advance the growth of knowledge appear to be quite robust, even though 
the constitutional requirements for their flourishing may be unevenly met in different 
locations and at different times. 
  It is this combination of local vulnerability and global robustness that Hans 
Albert (2004: 38; 2006: 126f.) points out as common feature of markets and of 
                                                 
48 Leonard (2002: 146): “The criteria of validity of claims to scientific knowledge are not matters of 
national taste and culture. Sooner or later, competing claims to validity are settled by the universalistic 
facts of nature which are consonant with one and not with another theory.” 
  21science when he notes that a government may well undermine the stability of a 
national financial system and cause a national crisis by misguided regulations, but that 
this does not prevent international financial markets from functioning, and that, 
likewise, a government may well ruin the scientific institutions of a country by 
unsuitable legislation, but that this does not prevent the international system of 
science from functioning. As a global system science can be trusted to advance the 
growth of knowledge, deficiencies in local constitutions of science notwithstanding. 
As Jarvie (2002: 230) puts it: “The authority of science, unlike the authority of other 
institutions, is not bounded by national jurisdiction. What is truth on this side of the 
Pyrenees remains truth on the other side.” 
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